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The use of contingent valuation (CV) methods for estimating the economic 
value of environmental improvements and damages has increased significantly. 
However, doubts exist regarding the validity of the usual willingness to pay 
CV methods. In this paper we examine the CV approach in light of recent 
findings from behavioral decision research regarding the constructive nature of 
human preferences. We argue that a principal source of problems with 
conventional CV methods is that they impose unrealistic cognitive demands 
upon respondents. We propose a new CV approach, based on the value-
structuring capabilities of multiattribute utility theory and decision analysis, 
and discuss its advantages· and disadvantages. 
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Contingent valuation (CV) has been used by economists to value public goods for 
about twenty-five years. The approach posits a hypothetical market for an unpriced good and 
asks individuals to state the dollar value they place on a proposed change in its quantity, 
quality, or access. Development of the CV concept has been described in reviews by 
Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze (1986) and Mitchell and Carson (1989). The approach 
is now widely used to value many different goods whose quantity or quality might be 
' 
affected by the decisions of a public agency or private developer. Environmental goods have 
received particular attention because they are highly valued by society and entail 
controversial tradeoffs (e.g., manufacturing costs vs. pollution, urban development vs. 
wetlands protection) but are not usually sold through markets (Bromley, 1986). 
The visibility of CV methods1 has greatly increased following the 1989 interpretation 
of CERCLA (the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
of 1986) by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals (in Ohio v. United States 
Department of the Interior). This decision (a) granted equal standing to expressed and 
revealed preference evaluation techniques (with willingness to pay measures preferred in all 
cases), (b) accepted nonuse values as a legitimate component of total resource value, and (c) 
recognized a "distinct preference" in CERCLA for restoring damaged natural resources 
rather than simply compensating for the losses (Kopp, Portney, and Smith, 1990). The 
court's opinion on these three issues will likely lead to a substantial redrafting of the 
Department of Interior's rules for natural resource damage assessments. 
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Interest in CV applications has given rise to much research. Recent studies, for 
example, have used CV to estimate the value of wetlands protection (Loomis, Hanemann, 
and Kanninen, 1991), water quality improvements (Desvousges, Smith, and Fisher, 1987), 
groundwater (Mitchell and Carson, 1989), and forest wildlife resources (Walsh et al., 1990).2 
On the other hand, much has been written about problems with CV techniques: they capture 
attitudinal intentions rather than behavior (Ajzen and Peterson, 1988), important information 
is omitted froni CV questionnaires (Fischhoff and Furby, 1988), and their results are 
susceptible to influence from cognitive and contextual biases (Brown and Slovic, 1988). 
One response to these criticisms is to argue that CV methods can provide valid 
estimates of resource values if studies are done carefully. This is the position taken by many 
practitioners of CV methods (e.g., Brookshire and Coursey, 1987; Randall, Hoehn, and 
Brookshire, 1983). Several prominent critics of current CV methods also have argued for 
greater care in application; for example, Fischhoff and Furby (1988) provided detailed 
listings of the information needed to inform CV participants sufficiently about the assigned 
payment task, the social context for evaluation, and the good under consideration. 
In contrast, others view these problems as casting doubt on the accuracy of CV 
responses and the usefulness of even the most carefully conducted CV results in litigation artd 
damage assessments. Indeed, some reject CV as a method for obtaining monetary values of 
unpriced environmental goods. For example, Phillips and Zeckhauser (1989) questioned 
whether any CV study will be able to meet standard criteria of reliability and validity. 
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Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) have argued that CV responses denote moral sentiments rather 
than economic values. 
We believe there is a need for monetary assessments of environmental damages and 
that an evaluation approach based m~ individual's expressed preferences is appropriate for 
this purpose. However, we believe that the wholistic measures of monetary value used in 
current CV methods are flawed because they impose unrealistic cognitiv~ demands upon 
respondents. In our view,. improved methods for valuing nonmarket natural resources can be 
found by paying closer attention to the multidimensional nature of environmental values and 
to the constructive nature of human preferences (Gregory and McDaniels, 1987). The 
underlying assumption of the approach to be discussed in this. paper is that people have 
strong feelings, beliefs, and values for m3:11y things that are not sold through markets 
(Brown, 1984). However, people's cognitive beliefs about these values typjcally are not 
numerically quantified and, most importantly for CV, are not represented monetarily. 
The fact that people are not used to thinking about environmental goods in monetary 
units suggests that a CV approach must function as a kind of tutorial, building the monetary 
value as it elicits it. We therefore view a CV survey as an active process of value 
constructiofl (Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic, 1988) rather than as a neutral process of value 
discovery. Thus, we believe, the designers of a CV study should function not as 
archaeologists, carefully uncovering what is there~ but as architects, working to build a . 
defensible expression of value. 
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reducing the risks from chemical products were higher when they were given paired 
comparisons (i.e., choices) than when they were asked to provide WTP values. Irwin et al. 
(in press) conducted several studies ,showing preference reversals in WTP. These studies · 
involved comparisons of improvements in consumer goods, such as a better camera or a 
better VCR, with improvements in air quality. Their successful prediction of preference 
reversals, whereby WTP based on a single-stimulus response favored improvements in 
consumer goods and WTP based on a choice response favored improvements in air quality, 
was based on two judgment effects found in the decision-making literature: the compatibility 
effect (Slovic, Griffin, and Tversky, 1990), and the prominence effect (Tversky, Sattath, and 
Slovic, 1988). 
Findings of preference reversals involving environmental values provide strong 
evidence for the constructive nature of preference. As Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic (1988) 
observed: 
In the classical analysis, the relation of preference is inferred from observed 
responses and is assumed to reflect the decision maker's underlying utility or 
value. But if different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of 
options, how can preferences and values be defined? And in what sense do 
they exist? (p. 383) 
The significance of changes in context on a person's expressed preferences supports 
this constructive view of values. For example, an attribute that. would otherwise be of minor 
importance is more heavily weighted if all the objects are clearly described in terms of that 
attribute, when other attribute descriptions are incomplete (Slovic and McPhillamy, 1974). 
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Huber (1980) showed that decision processes were influenced by whether information was 
presented in numerical or verbal form. Gaeth and Shanteau (1984) showed that inclusion of 
irrelevant information impaired judgment. Many context effects are grouped under the label 
framing effects (Hogarth, 1982; Tvetsky and Kahneman, 1981). For example, calling a sure 
loss "insurance" makes it more palatable (Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, 1982). 
Tversky and Kahneman's oft-cited "Asian disease" problem (1981) showed a reversal of 
preference when the wording of two public health problems was framed in terms of "saving 
lives" versus a "loss of life" framing. 
Not all the research on context effects applies directly to CV. All, however (and we 
have cited only a sampling above), reinforces the view that people are not just reporting their 
values or preferences. Instead, they are constructing them, with whatever help or cues the 
circumstances provide. 
The economists' prevailing response to preference construction is that wholistic 
measures of value can be trusted but separate values for components cannot (e.g., Freeman, 
1989; Randall, 1986). Yet this view, that people can aggregate values but cannot partition 
them, flies in the face of the decision-making literature. This literature tells us that, when 
faced with complex values, people often resort to simplifying strategies; Payne, Bettman, and 
Johnson (1992) have oriented their extensive review around this theme. Moreover, 
simplifying strategies increase when the complexity of the stimuli increases (Johnson, Meyer, 
and Ghose, 1989). Studies have found that people typically are unaware of their 
simplications and that, when people are asked to make wholistic judgments about 
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multidimensional stimuli, they typically make use of fewer cues than they say they do (Slovic 
and Lichtenstein, 1971). In short, the more complex a decision problem, the more likely 
that expressions of value will be constructed based on only a subset of the available 
information. Dawes (1977), for example, reviewed both this literature and the findings that 
simple combinations of judged parts accurately predict known wholes, and recommended just 
the opposite: trust the values obtained from decomposition procedures more than those 
obtained from wholistic judgments. 
An important corollary of the constructive view is that the strong values that people 
hold for environmental goods are not represented in their minds in monetary form. Consider 
all the goods that we might want to value in dollar terms. These could be arrayed on a 
continuum according to the level of market experience that we have with them. At one 
extreme would be goods such as groceries, for which market experience is great and the 
strength of our values or preferences can be relatively easily represented by a market price. 
As we move from groceries to appliances, automobiles, and homes, market experience 
lessens and the ease of representing our preferences monetarily declines as well. For goods 
such as air or water quality, wilderness areas, endangered species, and many other elements 
of the natural environment, the market no longer applies and the link between values and 
money becomes tenuous-so tenuous that it may not exist. Thus, we can have strongly held 
values that are not at all coded mentally in terms of dollars. Attempts to translate such 
values into monetary equivalents must take special cognizance of ,this problem. 
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One demonstration of the absence of a monetary representation for values comes from 
a study by Slovic, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1979) that asked people to evaluate the social 
seriousness of a death from a specified cause (e.g., alcoholism, cancer) by equating that 
death with a monetary loss. This was done by asking the respondents to compare a death 
from each cause to a standard unit of loss to society. In one condition, this standard loss 
was $1,000,000. In a second condition, with a new group of respondents, this standard loss 
was $10,000. Respondents were asked to provide a multiplying or dividing factor to indicate 
how many times greater (or smaller) the specified death (e.g., a cancer death) was in 
comparison to the standard; 
The geometric mean multipliers ranged in orderly fashion from smoking and alcohol-
caused deaths at the low end, judged less serious than the standard, to death from pesticides 
and nuclear power accidents at the extreme high end of the distribution. However, the mean 
ratios were almost identical in the two groups, despite the 100-fold difference in the 
comparison standard. For example, the geometric mean social cost for an alcohol-caused 
death was .91 for the $106 standard and .89 for the $1()4 standard. The correlation between 
the means in the two conditions, across 34 causes of death, was .94. In other words, the 
multiplying factors were almost perfectly consistent across the 34 items but the dollar values 
implied by the geometric means differed by a factor of 100. Although there may be other. 
I 
explanations, these results cari be interpreted as indicating that the seriousness of deaths from 
specified causes differed reliably across causes but was not represented monetarily in our 
respondents' minds. 
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We believe that the absence of any monetary representation is a principal cause of the 
embedding (or pan-whole) effect observed by both CV proponents (e.g., Mitchell and 
Carson, 1989) and critics (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992), whereby the same good is 
assigned a lower value when it is inferred from WTP for a more inclusive good than if the 
good is evaluated on its own. For example, Kahneman and Knetsch report that the 
willingness of Toronto residents to pay to maintain fishing by cleaning up the lakes in a 
small area of Ontario was almost as great as their willingness to pay to maintain fishing in all 
Ontario lakes. They replicated this finding for a diverse set of public goods. Kahneman and 
Knetsch interpreted their findings as indicating that the "good" that subjects are willing to 
pay for in these studies is a "sense of moral satisfaction" which exhibits an embedding effect: 
the satisfaction associated with contributing to an inclusive cause extends with little loss to 
any significant subset of that cause. An alternative explanation is that the subjects in these 
studies had no well-defined monetary representation of value for the goods. 
m. Desirable Features of an Environmental Values Elicitation Approach 
What are the characteristics of a good, defensible method for eliciting environmental 
values? The ultimate criterion is validity: a method clearly measures only what it's 
supposed to measure. In a classic paper, Cronbach and Meehl (1955) discussed four types of 
validity, of which three are relevant to CV methods: predictive, concurrent, and constructive 
validity. 3 Predictive and concurrent validity refer to the close relationships between the 
measure and a criterion of known validity (they differ only in timing: predictive validity 
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involves comparison with a future criterion; concurrent validity involves a present criterion). 
Economic theory posits just such a criterio'1 of known validity: unrestrained market prices at 
equilibrium. Unfortunately, CV methods are intended for use precisely in those situations 
for which no market exists. 
Construct validity is thus the concept underlying tests of CV' s validity. "A construct 
is defined implicitly by a network of associations or propositions in which it occurs . . . 
Construct validation is possible only when some of the statements in the network lead to 
predicted relations among observables" (Cronbach and Meehl, pp. 299-300). Economic 
theory, in which the construct of contingent valuation is embedded, generously satisfies these 
requirements. 
Construct validity is not sought via one definitive study but in the integration of 
evidence from many different sources. The finding that CV methods roughly match market 
values when they are applied, experimentally, to situations in which market values exist 
(Bishop and Heberlein, 1979; Dickie, Fisher, and Gerking, 1987) is one such piece of 
evidence favoring construct validity. . Other evidence comes from comparisons of different 
resource-assessment methods, such as comparing direct WTP with travel cost or hedonic 
(indirect) methods (e.g., Brookshire, Thayer, Schulze, and d' Arge, 1982; Smith, 
Desvousges, and Fisher, 1986). Such studies have shown agreement among measures within 
a range of about +/- 50% (Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze, 1986). Although a 50% 
margin of error might appall a polluter presented with a bill for damages under CERCLA, 
such findings do help to build the case for construct validity. 
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But construct validity also requires negative findings. If the method is valid, 
variables that should Mt affect the results do Mt. Here conventional CV methods fare 
poorly. First, there is a widely observed disparity between the maximum amount that people 
are willing to pay to acquire a good and the minimum amount they are willing to accept 
(WT A) to give it up. The observed difference between WTP and WT A is not, as economic 
theory would predict, small (most persuasively shown by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 
1990; see also Bishop and Heberlein, 1979; Knetsch and Sinden, 1984). Moreover, as noted 
earlier, the change from a WTP to a choice response mode induces reversals in the 
preference ordering of an environmental improvement versus a market-commodity 
improvement (Irwin et al., in press). Such findings contradict economic theory and thus 
seriously threaten the construct validity of WTP-based CV methods. 
We are not surprised by these validity-threatening findings, for underlying the search 
for validity are the assumptions that monetary values for nonmarket goods really do exist and 
researchers can find appropriate ways to measure them. In contrast, we hold that such 
values do Mt exist in monetary form. Instead, they are created during the elicitation 
process. Thus value formation is intimately tied to the specifics of the elicitation procedures. 
Following Simon's well-known distinction between procedural and substantive rationality 
(1978), we therefore present five process criteria that, if satisfied, can be used to defend the 
goodness of a CV method. 
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Criterion 1: Accommodate the Multidimensionality of Value 
There is a robust basis, in both economics and decision theory, for the perspective 
that people conceptualize goods in multidimensional terms (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; 
Lancaster, 1966). This is surely true for environmental goods, as symbolized by the 
"multiple use" concep~ that guides the resource-management policies of federal agencies such 
as the U.S. Forest Service. Bishop (1986) presents categories of economic benefits from the 
environment that include both consumptive and nonconsumptive user benefits as well as 
several classes of nonuser values. Environmental philosophers (e.g., Ralston, 1981) have 
distinguished a large number of dimensions that can be used to characterize environmental 
goods, including scientific, aesthetic, biodiversity, religious, symbolic, and life-support 
values in addition to economic and recreational values. 
The complexity and multidimensionality of environmental values means that a value 
elicitation method must be sensitive to this diversity of values. Yet a good CV method also 
must recognize the difficulties people have in thinking about such complexities. The 
experimental evidence previously described indicates that even when all aspects of all 
alternatives are fully described, people find it difficult to make explicit tradeoffs and typically 
rely on cognitive strategies that result in discounting or neglecting some important aspects. 
The typical CV task goes one step further: a wholistic response is requested for a 
single stimulus presented without either an explicit listing of the relevant dimensions of value 
or a description of the stimulus on each dimension. Because what is out of sight may be out 
of mind (Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1978), this situation can be expected to lead to 
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the greatest distortions in the expression of multidimensional values. Gregory, MacGregor, 
and Lichtenstein (1992) have shown that open-ended, wholistic WTP responses were poorly 
correlated, across a number of market and nonmarket goods, with several value-relevant 
attributes. Is this so surprising? In most elicitation settings, people have had no experience 
in thinking about the structure-the multiple dimensions or attributes-of their values. How 
can people think clearly about the big picture when they cannot distinguish clearly among the 
components? 
We realize that some CV studies include information about the attributes of the good 
under consideration. For example, some CV booklets extensively describe a proposed 
project. Others present two possible projects, described not only in text but also in a paired-
comparison chart of attributes (thus aiding the respondent to make a richer consideration). 
However, even these enhanced booklets describe facts and attributes of facts, rather than 
attributes of value. A good CV method requires not only the fostering of tradeoffs among 
many attributes but prior exploration to determine what attributes matter to people, so that 
the situation can be described in terms of these attributes. 
Criterion 2: Minimize Response Refusals 
Response refusals are a common problem in CV studies (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). 
Irwin et al. (1990), for example, reported that 35 percent of respondents either refused to 
provide a WTP response or reported zero WTP while reporting, on other scales, strong 
values for a proposed air-quality improvement. Elegant methods have been proposed for 
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estimating the missing WTP values. However, a better CV approach should avoid this 
vexing problem. We believe this can be achieved by asking respondents for an expression of 
monetary value rather than for their willingness to pay. 
Criterion 3: Exclude Irrelevancies 
If a CV study were intended to predict, for example, the results of a public vote on 
funding for a project, then any attribute value that will affect how peopl~ vote should 
properly be expressed in the study. However, contingent valuations are often needed for 
situations in which some aspects of value, even if strongly held, are legally or ethically 
irrelevant. For example, we conjecture that an individuals' willingness to pay to restore a 
damaged habitat or her willingness to accept compensation for an environmental loss will be 
strongly affected by the source of the damage (e.g., a natural cause vs. a careless spill by a 
detested chemical company). Legally, however, this attribute (who's to blame) is irrelevant 
under CERCLA. A good CV method should allow the exclusion of such attributes. This is 
difficult, if not impossible, for wholistic response methods like WTP or WTA. 
Criterion 4: Separate Facts from Values 
Defensible measures of value reql,lire respondents who have knowledge of the good 
under consideration as well as knowledge of their preferences with regard to the good. For 
simple goods or for activities with which people have extensive experience, it makes sense to 
assume that the respondents are competent to assess both facts and values. However, many 
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of the proposed environmental changes that form the subject of CV studies are scientifically 
complex. In such cases, a good CV method should not require that respondents have a 
thorough understanding of the scientific complexities in order to express their preferences. 
Consider the CV prescriptions advocated by Fischhoff and Furby (1988). They 
identify three types of information-relating to the good, the payment vehicle, and the social 
context-that should be provided to all respondents in a CV survey, thereby making 
everyone an expert. We agree that achievement of these criteria would lead to improved 
value estimates. However, we also believe that this approach is impractical if it is taken 
seriously because people are not experts in technical matters nor even good learners of 
technical information. 4 
Criterion 5: Ask the Right Question 
The usual CV study asks a WTP question, such as "How much would you be willing 
to pay each year in higher prices or increased taxes for ... ?" or "Would you be willing to 
pay $X each year in higher prices or increased taxes for ... ?11 (with $X varied across 
respondents). Questions based on willingness to accept (WTA) payment for some loss are 
less common, because refusal rates are considerably higher and because average responses 
seem unduly large (Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze, 1986; Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler, 1990). 
Consider the case where a factory discharges pollutants into a lake, causing 
environmental damage. The relevant question under CERCLA is: How much should the 
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damager pay? The general answer is that the damager is required under CERCLA to pay 
that amount necessary to restore or replace the lost resources (Kopp, Portney, and Smith, 
1990). Let us suppose that this is done to the extent reasonably possible, but that the repair 
takes some time and is not complete. Then the damager is liable both for losses from the 
time the damage occurs until the time the repair (whether by nature or by humans) is finished 
and for losses that cannot be repaired. How should a CV study assess the value of these 
losses? 
This is a typical question and an important one for environmental policy analysis. 
However, WTP or Wf A seems to us inappropriate for this question because it is not the 
responsibility of the respondent to pay for the damage. There are two separate points here. 
First, the request to pay for damages to the natural environment brings up the question of an 
individual's entitlement. If ownership of the resource (e.g., good water quality) forms part 
of a people's status quo assets, then why should they pay for what they already have a right 
to? The appropriate response is a refusal to pay. Second, under CERCLA, payment is the 
responsibility of the damager. Clearly, for some types of environmental damage, such as a 
widespread degradation of water quality caused by many damagers, the responsibility may 
effectively fall upon us all: whether we like it or not, consumer prices or taxes will pay for 
the clean up. But even in such cases, it is likely that many people will deny the 
responsibility. This denial seems to underlie the large percentage of refusals in many CV 
studies of damaged resources. 
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In the factory discharge considered here the damager is clearly liable. Thus we must 
consider WT A. However, if you, the respondent, ask for too much money-so that your 
demand is refused-what will happen? The essence of any WTP or WTA question is a 
tradeoff of some sort between money and a good. But here we are evaluating unrestorable 
losses. If you are not paid, there will still be a loss: there is no compensating event in the 
no-exchange alternative that provides a balance against which you can weigh your WT A. 
Lacking such restraint, why not go for the moon? 
It is tempting, in such cases, to ask a different question such as "How much would 
you pay to avoid a future spill like this one?" But this is, indeed, the wrong question, not 
only because it denies the true structure of the problem but also because the respondents are 
thereby limited by their own ability to pay although the real situation depends, instead, upon 
the damager's ability to pay. 
We have now trapped ourselves inside an uncomfortable box. WTP forms of CV 
questions are inappropriate for CERCLA cases because they lack the proper structure. WT A 
forms of CV questions are inappropriate for practical reasons. The usual way out of this 
conundrum for CV practitioners is to employ WTP questions anyway, perhaps with an 
apology. However, this apologetic stance strikes us as unfortunate because there is no reason 
why any measure of people's WTP needs to be obtained directly. Rather, what needs to be 
known for purposes of CERCLA is the monetary value people place on the damaged good. 
This brings us to the central argument for a new approach to eliciting values for 
environmental resources. If values are constructed during the elicitation process in a way 
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that is strongly determined. by context and has profound effects or:i the resultant evaluations, 
we should take a deliberate approach to value construction in a manner designed. to 
rationalize the process. 
IV. Using Multiattribute Utility Theory in Resource Valuations 
We believe that there already exists a sound, formal approach to. value construction 
that can provide the basis for an improved. CV method. This approach draws on the 
techniques and practices of multiattribute utility theory. 
Multiattribute utility theory (MAUT) underlies the practice of decision analysis and 
specifies, axiomatically, the conditions under which one can sensibly attach numbers to 
values. MAPT and decision analysis are systematic procedures designed. to assist people in 
making choices in the presence of conflicting objectives and uncertainty. They are "a 
formalization of common sense for decision problems that are too complex for informal use 
of common sense" (Keeney, 1982). Detailed. descriptions of MAUT and decision analysis 
are given by Keeney (1980) and by von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986). 
MAUT is essentially a set of axiomatic theories of preference (Keeney and Raiffa, 
1976). The central theorem of each theory says that if people can make choices based on 
their preferences and if these choices satisfy the axioms, then one can (a) assign numbers to 
utilities or values (we will use these terms as synonymous) and (b) specify a rule for 
. combining the numbers into a summary measure such that an object with a larger summary 
measure is preferred. over an object with a smaller summary measure. The measurement 
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scale underlying these utilities is not cardinal; it does not have an invariant zero point. But it 
is stronger than ordinal because the ordering of differences between the measures, as well as 
the ordering of the measures, is invariant. Psychologists call such a scale an interval scale 
(Stevens, 1951). 
The most helpful aspect of decision analysis is its ability to formally express 
subjective judgments in the assessment of alternatives and to establish an explicit framework 
for integrating the multidimensional components of complex values. However, some further 
development of these techniques will be needed to use decision analysis as the basis for 
improvements in CV methods. This is because the purpose of MA UT and decision analysis 
is to promote insight to help decision makers make choices among alternative plans of action. 
The purpose of a MAUT-based approach to CV would be more specific: to provide dollar-
based evaluations of specific nonmarket goods or programs. 
A. Proposed Approach 
The general approach required in a multiattribute CV (MAUT/CV) analysis can be 
described as a sequence of four steps. 
1. Structure the Problem 
In this step the analyst collects, lists, and organizes a description of the problem, 
identifying all the attributes (that is, all the aspects of the problem that have value to people). 
The goal is to develop an explicit, compreherisive picture of all factors that contribute 
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significantly to the value of the good or activity. To do so, the analyst will consult both 
technical experts, to get the facts, and the affected citizenry, to find the link between the 
facts and the values. 
This structuring process differs in two respects from the usual practice of CV. First, 
the value attributes are made explicit. The usual CV study, in contrast, describes the 
situation to be evaluated without such an explicit listing. The respondent is assumed to know 
all attributes of value or to infer them from descriptions in the questionnaire booklet. 
Second, a MAUT/CV would rely on the affected citizenry to elucidate the attributes of value. 
This step, which precedes the elicitation of values, is t:ypically omitted in CV. The value 
attributes implicit in the usual CV study come from experts in the topic of concern or from 
the study authors, rather than directly from the affected citizenry. 
In a MAUT/CV diverse groups of people should be consulted to select the value 
attributes. These stakeholders are defined in an operational sense as groups of people who, 
for any reason (e.g., place of residence, occupation, favored activities), share common 
values or opinions regarding a proposed action (Edwards and von Winterfeldt, 1987). The 
MAUT/CV analyst might convene three to ten stakeholder groups, each composed of three to 
seven people; from each group a values structure is elicited. Careful selection of stakeholder 
groups ensures that the full range of views is adequately covered. For example, the 
representatives of an environmental advocacy organization might be expected to present a 
somewhat different list of attributes than would members of the local Chamber of , 
f 
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Commerce, but the views of these two groups are likely to encompass those of many other 
citizens. 
In a complex problem, the expressed attributes will vary in level of generality and 
therefore often can be structured hierarchically into a value tttree." The eventual goal is to 
find a single hierarchy of values that all the shareholders can agree is complete. This values 
hierarchy must also be built with due concern for the form of the utility combination rule. 
The simplest such rule is additive; one adds all the utilities of the lowest-level scales to find 
the total utility. This combination rule requires value independence: the value of one level 
of one attribute must not depend upon what the levels are on the other attributes. The 
decision analyst must probe frequently for value independence; lack of independence may 
signal an additional, unreported attribute of value. 
The finished values hierarchy may have components using causal models, economic 
models, influence or means-ends diagrams, and so forth showing the linkages between 
specific measures at the bottom and the abstract attributes at the top. Depending on the 
situation, some components may have probabilities explicitly built into the model, so that the 
final utility calculation will be an expected utility. 
Suppose that someone wanted to do a MAUT/CV study of the monetary value of the 
damage resulting from a specific pollutant dumped into Lake Michigan. Technical experts 
can provide information describing the lake before and after the damage. These descriptions 
then can be presented to representatives of the people affected by the damage to identify the 
· value attributes. For example, the physical event of the death of a large number of fish 
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might imply aesthetic loss (when the dead fish wash up on the shore), loss of genetic 
diversity, and loss of commercial fishing jobs and profits; these losses indicate the value 
attributes. 
Generic attributes for the lake problem might be Effects on Scenic Beauty, Effects on 
Genetic Diversity, Human Health Effects, Effects on Commerce, and so forth. Each 
attribute would have sub-attributes; for example, sub-attributes influencing Effects on 
Commerce might be Real Estate Values (the price of vacation homes would go down if the 
shore line becomes ugly), Tourist Values, and Entitlement (expressing the general public's 
non-use value for a beautiful lake). Some or all of these sub-attributes m~ght be further 
broken down into sub-sub-attributes, and so forth until all relevant values have been listed 
and organized. At the lowest level each attribute is described. in terms of some specific 
measure. For example, one sub-component of Scenic Beauty concerned with shore-line 
attractiveness might have as its bottom-level measure the number of dead fish per acre of 
beach. 
2. Assess Utilities 
A typical CV study elicits values from a random sample of the affected citizenry; 
WTP responses are given by hundreds or thousands of people. In contrast, an approach 
based in decision analysis would elicit utilities (values) from the stakeholder groups, less than 
100 people. Depth of value analysis is substituted for breadth of population sampling. 
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Utilities are assesse.d for every lowest-level value scale. To start with, it is 
convenient to assess every utility on a common scale, say, from Oto 100. For example, the 
maximum number of dead fish per acre on Lake Michigan beaches as a result of our 
hypothetical pollutant spill might be assigned a utility score of 100 and the minimum impact 
level, perhaps O dead fish per acre, would be assigned a score of 0. It is essential that this 
range of outcomes be carefully specified, that the range encompass all reasonably possible 
values for the attribute measure, and that this range, once chosen, remain fixed throughout 
the analysis. Tradeoffs are then assessed, using weights or multiplicative factors-that rescale 
the utilities in recognition that not all attributes of value are equally important. 
All these value elicitations would be done with numerous consistency checks. If you 
have told the analyst that a change from Oto 100 on scale A is twice as good as a ·change 
from Oto 100 on scale Band that a change from Oto 100 on scale Bis four times as good as 
such a change on scale C, the analyst will then check to see that you do, indeed, believe that 
the scale A change is eight times as good as the scale C change. 
3. Calculate the Total Value 
Once all the pieces are in place, the combination rule specifies how to calculate the 
total utility for any particular plan, program, or scenario. This total utility will be expressed 
using a single arbitrary "utile" unit of measurement. For contingent valuation, these units 
must be converted to dollars. In theory, this conversion need only be made at one place in 
the model. For example, one such conversion might be made in the Lake Michigan pollution 
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example by noting the monetary value and the utility (or, here, disutility) of the loss of one 
ton of fish to one fishery. Because all utilities, including this one, are measured on a 
common scale, the monetary worth of all utilities, including the total utility, can be computed 
from this one conversion. In practice, of course, one would want to find several parts of the 
model for which both utilities and their monetary equivalents are known (e.g., real estate 
values, perhaps even the value of a life). 
4. Perform Sensitivity Analysis 
The final step required in performing a MAUT/CV analysis would be to recalculate 
the final utility, using variations in the utilities and tradeoffs, to see how sensitive the final 
answer is to such variations (Merkhofer and Keeney, 1987). Sensitivity analyses performed 
on a first-draft MAUT/CV might be used to show which aspects should, because of their 
• 
strong effect upon the total, be subjected to additional stakeholder elicitations or to large-
scale sampling of public values; 
Different stakeholder groups can be expected to produce different utilities and 
tradeoffs; thus, the total monetary value may differ across groups. Sensitivity analysis will 
reveal the most important causes of these disagreements. The analyst can then return to each 
of the stakeholder groups to explore the possibility that small changes in their utilities and 
tradeoffs would be acceptable to the group yet produce a total value more similar to the total 
value calculated for other groups. Although there is some encouraging evidence (Gardiner 
and Edwards, 1975) that the use of MAUT diminishes the disagreement between highly 
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polarized groups, further research is needed to explore the conditions under which a single 
monetary value can be found that adequately expresses the values of all stakeholders. 
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of MAUTICV 
The linkage of MAUT to contingent~valuation approaches will not be an all-purpose 
panacea. However, we believe that use of a MA UT-based approach to CV offers some 
strong advantages and possible solutions to several of the most troubling problems 
confronting environmentaj. researchers. We start by discussing MAUT/CV in terms of the 
five evaluative criteria discussed above. We then comment on other advantages and 
disadvantages of a multiattribute CV approach .. 
1. Accommodates the Multidimensionality of Value 
The judgments required as inputs to a MA UT/CV model will not be easy ones to make. But 
they are not wholistic judgments requiring the simultaneous integration of many dimensions 
of value. Thus, it is less likely that important aspects of value will be lost because of 
cognitive overload. Most importantly, the values that guide a MAUT/CV study will be 
elicited from a wide range of the potentially affected stakeholders. These stakeholders have 
a right to express their values as part of an open, constructive decision-aiding process. In 
contrast, the values that guide a conventional CV study are those of the experts-. be they 
economists, psychologists, or lawyers-who have been asked to write the CV questionnaire. 
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We believe this to be an inferior process, because in the absence of early stakeholder 
involvement it is easy for important values to be neglected or mispecified. 
2. Minimizes Response Refusals 
MAUT measures value without regard to the problem of who must pay, an issue that can be 
decided in the voting booth or by the courts. To the extent that this problem underlies 
response refusals, a multiattribute CV procedure should reduce or eliminate the problem. 
One obstacle to incorporating MAUT techniques is an ethical concern, stemming from 
the quantification of utilities for various goods and activities. Recognizing distinctions . 
among value components and putting numbers on values is not easy and, to some members 
of the public, it may be repugnant (MacGregor and Slovic, 1986). The argument can be 
made that the assignment of numerical values only makes clear the trade-offs that otherwise 
stiUwould be made implicitly rather than explicitly. For some this logic will be soothing; 
for others, however, any process requiring quantification is likely to remain questionable. 
n 
A further source of response refusals may arise from the extreme stances taken by 
different groups of stakeholders in a politically potent CV situation. Some stakeholder 
groups may refuse to participate for political or strategic reasons or because they distrust the 
agency conducting the study. In such situations, success may rest on the analyst's ability to 
convince respondents that cooperation in expressing their values will have a genuine impact 
on the results and that response refusals unfortunately may lead to the omission of their point 
of view. 
3. Excludes Irrelevancies 
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A MAUT/CV model would explicitly list the sources of value. Thus, a MAUT-based CV 
approach would address the real issues in the problem and permit in-depth examination of the 
factual and values bases for concern. If irrelevant attributes are proposed in the problem-
structuring stage, the analyst can either exclude them from the model completely or include 
them as separate aspects whose effects on the total value can later be calculated. 
4. Separates Facts from Values 
Conducting a multiattribute CV study requires extensive knowledge about the facts of a 
problem and detailed elicitations of people's values. But the method allows the analyst to 
distinguish facts from values; stakeholders are asked to determine the components of value; 
experts then make the factual contributions to understand impact pathways and magnitudes. 
Thus, the people whose values are sought do not need to understand scientific complexities in 
order to express their values. Instead, their values are expressed in numerous pieces with 
each piece selected to be a readily understandable measure. 
5. Asks the Right Question 
There are many occasions when the financial ability of a population of people provides an 
appropriate and sensible limit on their willingness to pay and thus on their contingent 
valuation for some situation. This occurs, for example, when tax monies will be dedicated to 
a specific project. But often people's ability to pay is irrelevant to the contingent valuation 
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problem. One prominent example is CERCLA cases, in which the goal of the valuation 
enterprise is to determine the monetary payment that must be made by a polluter. Here, 
MA UT has a distinct advantage in avoiding willingness to pay as a measure of value; it asks 
the right question: How valuable is this? 
. 6. Other Advantages and Disadvantages 
Integrates market and nonmarket values. Neither values for which extensive, 
competitive markets exist nor diffuse, vague, but strongly-held nonmarket values get an 
advantage in a MAUT model. Economic models can be subsumed into the model where 
appropriate. Explicit and simple measures can qe sought for vague and diffuse nonmarket 
values. The strength of the approach is that the model can integrate these.different kinds of 
value. 
Lessens the embedding problem. There may be several causes of the embedding 
problem. Earlier in this paper we suggested that the absence of a monetary representation 
for a good may be a principal reason for embedding. In this case, the use of a MAUT-based 
approach to CV should help because it will assist people to structure their monetary values in 
a defensible manner. It also may be, as Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) suggest, that people 
are not really responding to the specific problem but are reporting a general willingness to 
donate money to good causes. Because spending money is not directly the focus of MAUT 
elicitations; this source of embedding would not occur. 
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Alternatively, people may be trying to respond to the given problem but are unable to 
be sufficiently sensitive to its specifications (e.g., 2,000 dead fish, not 4,000 dead fish) 
because of its complexity. Two characteristics of a MAUT/CV method should increase such 
sensitivity. First, MAUT elicitation methods are decompositional and therefore do not . 
require people to juggle many aspects of value at the same time. Second, the utility for each 
attribute is elicited across an entire range; respondents are, for example, asked to provide 
scale values separately for 2,000 fish and for 4,000 fish. It is hardly credible that in such a 
situation the respondents would give the same utility regardless of the number. 
Irwin et al. (1990) have described another form of the embedding problem that seems 
to derive from people's beliefs about non-independence. They report approximately the same 
WTP for health improvements due to cleaner air, visibility improvements, and all 
improvements, apparently because the respondents assumed that any air cleaning leading to 
better health inevitably would also lead to better visibility, even though the researchers didn't 
mention it. In the MAUT method, such beliefs about non-independence would be discovered 
in the structuring stage; the model would be adjusted to accommodate them. 
Flexible in changing circumstances. A MAUT/CV model would elicit a broad range 
of values for each attribute. As a result, the information is available so that the calculations 
can be redone if the circumstances change. Changing circumstances that add new elements 
to the problem, of course, will require further modeling and new elicitations. But in most 
cases such changes will involve a small portion of the whole analysis, most of which will not 
need re-doing. 
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Suitablefor construction. We have presented the view that people have not formed 
monetary values for many complex, nonmarket goods such as environmental improvements. 
Thus a successful CV method should help the respondents to think carefully and thoroughly 
about what they value in order to f'?rm their values. A MA UT/CV approach would provide 
the setting for such extensive consideration, in both its structuring and its valuing phases. 
Every value elicitation method affects the values being elicited. So a MAUT-based 
method surely will. We cannot know the exact effects it would exert on people's values. 
But the process and results of a MA UT/CV would be explicitly recorded and thus open to 
scrutiny. In contrast to a WTP or a WTA study, one would be far less troubled by 
wondering what the respondents were and were not taking into consideration when expressing 
their values. 
Cost. As far as we know, MAUT never has been used for contingent valuation of 
environmental resources. The first few exemplars might cost more than WTP studies now 
do because MAUT techniques would have to be adjusted and developed to meet CV 
applications whereas WTP techniques already have been extensively developed. After that, 
we don't know. A related concern derives from the required expertise: a MAUT/CV 
analysis would require the analyst to participate in the entire elicitation procedure with each 
stakeholder group. One of the criticisms often leveled at MAUT techniques is that their 
application requires as much art as science at a time when resources are scarce and there are 
few accomplished practitioners. However, the practice of a MAUT/CV effort strikes us as 
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no more demanding or subjective than the practice of conventional CV or, for that matter, 
cost-benefit analysis (Gregory, Keeney, and von Winterfeldt, 1992). 
V. Conclusion 
Recent evidence from behavioral decision research casts a perspective on contextual 
effects that goes beyond bias and challenges traditional views of the nature and stability of 
environmental preferences and values. According to this view, preferences and values for 
objects that are unfamiliar and complex are often constructed, rather than revealed, in the 
elicitation process. 
We believe that the concept of constructed preferences has important implications for 
the dollar-based measurement of environmental values. Environmental resources typically 
are complex goods that are valued across a number of diverse dimensions and that have not 
been thought about in quantitative terms, let alone dollar terms. Wholistic measures of 
monetary value, as have been used in most CV studies, ignore these cognitive realities and 
require people to engage in a task that exceeds their capabilities. We propose that 
practitioners, rather than giving up on the attempt, adopt explicit value-structuring techniques 
that will link CV efforts with multiattribute utility theory and decision analysis. This new 
CV method has the potential to eliminate many of the most vexing problems of conventional 
CV approaches and provide defensible monetary measures of environmental values. 
References 
Valuing Environmental Resources 
Gregory, Lichtenstein, & Slovic / 34 
Ajzen, leek, and George L. Peterson. (1988). "Contingent value measurement: the price of 
everything and the value of nothing?" In George L. Peterson, B. L. Driver, and 
Robin Gregory (ed.), Amenity resource valuation: integrating economics with other 
·disciplines. State College, PA: Venture, 65-76. 
Bishop, Richard. (1986). "Resource valuation under uncertainty: theoretical principles for 
empirical research." In Advances in applied micro-economics, vol. 4. JAI Press, Inc., 
· 133-152. 
Bishop, Richard, and Thomas Heberlein. (1979). "Measuring values of extramarket goods: 
are indirect measures biased?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 61, 926-
930. 
Bromley, Daniel. (ed.) (1986). Natural resource economics: policy problems and 
contemporary analysis. Boston, Massachusetts: Kluwer, Nighoff Publishing. 
Brookshire, David S., and Donald Coursey. (1987). "Measuring the value of a public good: 
An empirical comparison of elicitation procedures," American Economic Review 77, 
554-566. 
Brookshire, David S., Mark Thayer, William D. Schulze, and Ralph d' Arge. (1982). 
"Valuing economic goods: a comparison of survey and hedonic approaches, 11 
American Economic Review 12, 165-177. 
Brown, Thomas C. (1984). "The concept of value in resource allocation," Land Economics 
60, 231-246. 
Brown, Thomas C., and Paul Slovic. (1988). "Effects of context on economic measures of 
value." In George L. Peterson, B. L. Driver, and Robin Gregory (ed.), Integrating 
economic and psychological knowledge in valuations of public amenity resources. 
State College, PA: Venture, 23-30. 
Cronbach, Lee J., and Paul M. Meehl. (1955). "Construct validity in psychological tests," 
Psychological Rulletin 52, 281-302. 
Cummings, Ronald G., David S. Brookshire, and William D. Schulze. (1986). Valuing 
environmental goods: Assessment of the contingent valuation method. Totowa, New 
Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld. 
Valuing Environmental Resources 
Gregory, Lichtenstein, & Slovic / 35 
Dawes, Robyn M. (1977). "Predictive models as a guide to preference," IEEE Transactions 
on Systems, Man and Cybernetics SMC-7, 355-358. 
Desvousges, William, V. K. Smith, and Anthony Fisher. (1987). "Option price estimates for 
water quality improvements: A contingent valuation study for the Monongahela 
River," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 14, 248-267. 
Dickie, Mark, Ann Fisher, and Shelby Gerking. (1987). "Market transactions and 
hypothetical demand data: A comparative study," Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 82, 69-75. 
Edwards, Ward. (1954). "The theory of decision making," Psychological Bulletin 51, 380-
417. 
Edwards, Ward. (1961). "Behavioral decision theory," Annual Review of Psychology 12, 
473-498. 
Edwards, Ward, and Detlof von Winterfeldt. (1987). "Public values in risk debates," Risk 
Analysis 1, 141-158. 
Einhorn, Hillel J., and Robin M. Hogarth. (1981). "Behavioral decision theory: processes of 
judgment and choice," Annual Review of Psychology 32, 53-88. 
Fischhoff, Baruch, and Lita Furby. (1988). "Measuring values: a conceptual framework for 
interpreting transactions with special reference to contingent valuation of visibility," 
Journal of Risk and Uncenainty 1, 147-184. 
Fischhoff, Baruch, Paul Slovic, and Sarah Lichtenstein. (1978). "Fault trees: sensitivity of 
estimated failure probabilities to problem representation," Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 4, 330-344. 
Freeman, Myrick A. (1989). "Nonuse values in natural resource damage assessments." draft 
manuscript, In Ray Kopp, and V. Kerry Smith (ed.), Valuing natural assets: The 
economics of natural resource damage assessments. Washington, DC: Resources for 
the Future. 
Gaeth, Gary J., and James Shanteau. (1984). "Reducing the influence of irrelevant 
information on experienced decision makers," Organizational Behavior and Human 
Performance 33, 263-282. 
Valuing Environmental Resources 
Gregory, Lichtenstein, & Slovic / 36 
Gardiner, Peter C., and Ward Edwards. (1975). "Public values: Multiattribute-utility 
measurement for social decision making." In M. F. Kaplan, and S. Schwartz (ed.), 
Human judgment and decision processes. New York: Academic, 1-37. 
Gregory, Robin, Ralph L. Keeney, and Detlof von Winterfeldt. (1992). "Adapting the 
environmental impact statement process to inform decision makers," Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management 11, 58-75. 
Gregory, Robin, Donald MacGregor, and Sarah Lichtenstein. (1992). "Assessing the quality 
of expressed preference measures of value," Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 17, 277-292. 
Gregory, Robin, and Tim McDaniels. (1987). "Valuing environmental losses: What promise 
does the right measure hold?," Policy Sciences 20, 11-26. 
Grether, David M., and Charles R. Plott. (1979). "Economic theory of choice and the 
preference reversal phenomenon," American Economic Review 69, 623-638. 
Hogarth, Robin. (ed.) (1982). New directions for methodology of social and behavioral 
science: Questionframing and response consistency. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Huber, Oswald. (1980). "The influence of some task variables on cognitive operations in an 
information-processing decision model," Acta Psychologica 45, 187-196. 
Irwin, Julie R., Douglas Schenk, Gary H. McClelland, William D. Schulze, Thomas 
Stewart, and Mark Thayer. (1990). "Urban visibility: some experiments on the 
contingent valuation method." In C. V. Mathei (ed.), Visibility and.fine panicles. 
Pittsburgh, PA: Air and Waste Management Association, 647-658. 
Irwin, Julie R., Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein, and Gary H. McClelland. (In press). 
"Preference reversals and the measurement of environmental values," Journal of Risk 
and Uncenainty. 
Johnson, Eric J., Robert M. Meyer, and Sanjoy Ghose. (1989). "When choice models fail: 
compensatory representations in negatively correlated environments," Journal of 
Marketing Research 26, 255-270. 
Jones-Lee, Michael, Mark Hammerton, and Richard Phillips. (1985). "The value of safety: 
Results from a national survey," Economic Journal 95, 49-72. 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Jack Knetsch. (1992). "Valuing public goods: The purchase of moral 
satisfaction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 22, 57-70. 
Valuing Environmental Resources 
Gregory, Lichtenstein, & Slovic / 37 
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler. (1990). "Experimental tests of 
the endowment effect and the Coase Theorem," Journal of Political Economy 98, 
1325-1348. 
Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky. (Eds.) (1982). Judgment under 
uncenainty: Heuristics and biases. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Keeney, Ralph L. (1980). Siting energy facilities. New York: Academic. 
Keeney, Ralph L. (1982). "Decision analysis: An overview," Operations Research 30, 803-. 
838. 
Keeney, Ralph L., and Howard Raiffa. (1976). Decisions with multiple objectives. New 
York: Wiley. 
Knetsch, Jack, and Jack Sinden .. (1984). "Willingess to pay and compensation demanded," 
Quanerly Journal of Economics 99, 507-521. 
Kopp, Raymond, Paul Portney, and V. Kerry Smith. (1990). "Natural resource damages: 
The economics have shifted after Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior," 
Environmental Law Reponer 4, 10127-10131. 
Lancaster, Kelvin. ( 1966). "A new approach to consumer theory," Journal of Political 
Economy 74, 132-157. 
Lichtenstein, Sarah, and Paul Slovic. (1971). "Reversals of preference between bids and 
choices in gambling decisions," Journal of Experimental Psychology 89, 46-55. 
Loomis, John B., Michael Hanemann, and Barbara Kanninen. (1991). "Willingness to pay to 
. protect wetlands and reduce wildlife contamination from agricultural drainage." In A. 
Dinar, and D. Zilberman (ed.), The economics and management of water and 
drainage in agriculture. Boston: Kluwer Academic. 
MacGregor, Donald, and Paul Slovic. (1986). "Perceived acceptance of risk analysis as a 
decision-making approach," Risk Analysis 6, 245-256. 
Merkhofer, M. W., and Ralph L. Keeney. (1987). "A multiattribute utility analysis of 
alternative sites for the disposal of nuclear waste," Risk Analysis 7, 173-194. 
Mitchell, Robert C., and Richard T. Carson. (1989). Using surveys to value public goods: 
the contingent valuation method. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. 
Valuing Environmental Resources 
Gregory, Lichtenstein, & Slovic / 38 
Payne, John W., James R. Bettman, and Eric J. Johnson. (1992). "Behavioral decision 
research: A constructive processing perspective," Annual Review of Psychology 43, 
87-132. 
Phillips, Carl, and Richard Zeckhauser. (1989). "Contingent valuation of damage to natural 
resources: How accurate? How appropriate?," Toxics Law Reporter, October 4, 520-
529. 
Ralston, Holmes. (1981). "Values in nature," Envirownental Ethics 3, 115-128. 
Randall, Alan. (1986). "Valuation in a policy context" In Daniel Bromley (ed.), Natural 
resource economics: policy problems and contemporary analysis. Boston, 
Massachusetts: Kluwer, Nighoff Publishing, 163-200. 
Randall, Alan, John Hoehn, and David Brookshire. (1983). "Contingent valuation surveys 
for evaluating environmental assets," Natural Resources Journal 23, 635-648. 
Simon, H. (1978). "Rationality as process and as product of thought," American Economic 
Review 68, 1-16. 
Slovic, Paul, Baruch Fischhoff, and Sarah Lichtenstein. (1982). "Response mode, framing, 
and information-processing effects in risk assessment." In Robin Hogarth (ed.), New 
directions for methodology of social and behavioral science: Question framing and 
response consistency. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 21-36. 
Slovic, Paul, Dale Griffin, and Amos Tversky. (1990). "Compatibility Effects in Judgment 
and Choice." In Robin M. Hogarth (ed.), Insights in Decision Making: A Tribute to 
Hillel J. Einhorn. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 5-27. 
Slovic, Paul, and Sarah Lichtenstein. (1971). "Comparison of Bayesian and regression 
approaches to the study of information processing in judgment," Organizational 
Behavior and Human Performance 6, 649-744. 
Slovic, Paul, Sarah Lichtenstein, and Baruch Fischhoff. (1979). "Images of disaster: 
Perception and acceptance of risks from nuclear power." In G. Goodman, and W. 
Rowe (ed.), Energy risk management. London: Academic, 223-245. 
Slovic, Paul, and Douglas J. McPhillamy. (1974). "Dimensional commensurability and cue 
utilization in comparative judgment," Organizational Behavior and Human 
Performance 11, 172-194. 
Valuing Environmental Resources 
Gregory. Lichtenstein, & Slovic / 39 
Smith, V. Kerry, William Desvousges, and Ann Fisher. (1986). "A comparison of direct and 
indirect methods for estimating environmental benefits, 11 American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 68, 280-290. 
Stevens, S. S. (1951). "Mathematics, measurement, and psychophysics." In S. S. Stevens 
(ed.), Handbook of Experimental Psychology. New York: Wiley, 1-49. 
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. (1981). "The framing of decisions and the 
psychology of choice," Science 211, 453-458. 
Tversky, Amos, Shmuel Sattath, and Paul Slovic. (1988). "Contingent weighting in judgment 
and choice," Psychological Review 95, 371-384. 
Tversky, Amos, Paul Slovic, and Daniel Kahneman. (1990). "The.causes of preference 
reversal," American Economic Review 80, 204-217. 
Viscusi, W. Kip, and Wesley A. Magat. (1987). Leaming about risk: Consumer and worker 
responses to hazard warnings. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Viscusi, W. Kip, Wesley A. Magat, and Joel Huber. (1986). "Informational regulation of 
consumer health risks: an empirical evaluation of hazard warnings, 11 Rand Journal of 
Economics 17, 351-365. 
von Winterfeldt, Detlof, and Ward Edwards. (1986). Decision analysis and behavioral 
· research. New York: Cambridge. 
Walsh, R. G., R. D. Bjonback, R. A. Aiken, and D. H. Rosenthal. (1990). "Estimating the 
public benefits of protecting forest quality," Journal of Environmental Management 
30, 175-189. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Valuing Environmental Resources 
Gregory, Lichtenstein, & Slovic / 40 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Decision, Risk, and 
Management Science Program, National Science Foundation, through Grants SES 88-12707 
and SES 90-22952 to Decision Research. We thank Ralph Keeney, Julie Irwin, John Payne, 
and Detlof von Winterfeldt for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this 
manuscript. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this 
paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National 
Science Foundation. 
FOOTNOTES 
Valuing Environmental Resources 
Gregory, Lichtenstein, & Slovic / 41 
1. Despite the many references in the literature to "the Contingent Valuation 
Method" (e.g., Mitchell & Carson, 1989), CV is a conceptual approach which, in 
application, employs any variety of methods. 
2. WTP techniques also are used to value human health and safety (Jones-Lee, 
Hammerton, & Phillips, 1985; Viscusi & Magat, 1987); however, this paper focuses on the 
evaluation of environmental resources rather than the WTP research on health and safety 
issues. 
3. The fourth, content validity, applies only to testing situations. To assess the 
content validity of a typing test, for example, one would show that the test is an appropriate 
sample of the universe of typing skills. 
4. Indeed, it has occurred to us that Fischhoff and Furby, in writing their paper, may 
have had an ulterior motive: to list so many requisites that the reader would realize the 
impossibility of achieving them without the authors' having to say so. 
